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Catharine Trotter and the Claims of Conscience
Abstract

Although Catherine Trotter, later Cockburn, has begun to receive increased critical attention, the role of
religious themes in her writing remains largely unexplored. A key tendency in critical accounts, in fact, has
been to ally her with the secular contractarian philosophy of John Locke, whom she defended in print.
Biographical evidence suggests, however, that Trotter was not unconcerned with religious questions; raised an
Anglican, she converted to Catholicism in her youth and returned to the Church of England in her early
thirties. Her later philosophical works remain preoccupied with theological issues, notably voluntarism. This
article proposes that we can identify religious concerns in Trotter’s early plays by recognizing how her
tragedies dramatize cases of conscience. Her characters often struggle to accept the binding nature of vows
and question the power of private conscience to govern conduct. In The Unhappy Penitent (1701), the
influence of the Catholic casuistical tradition is seen as Trotter casts doubt on the adequacy of private moral
judgment, suggesting that individuals will judge right only when aided by an authoritative and external guide.
Emphasizing the tragic consequences that follow from pursuing one’s interests, the dramas qualify
assessments of Trotter that align her modernity with secularity.
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Catharine Trotter and the Claims of Conscience
Joanne E. Myers
Gettysburg College

In her day, Catharine Trotter—later Cockburn—enjoyed a divided
reputation, dogged by rumors of licentiousness even as she was alternately praised and mocked for her erudition. “I read Aristotle in his own
Language,” proclaims Calista, a character in the anonymous The Female
Wits; or the Triumverate of Poets at Rehearsal (1696) generally seen to
represent Trotter; she adds, “The Translation may alter the Expression.”1
Delarivier Manley was initially supportive of Trotter, but she turned her
satiric wit on her friend in both The New Atalantis (1709), which shows
Trotter embroiled in flirtations with men and women alike, and in The
Adventures of Rivella (1714), which also names Trotter “Calista” and accuses
her of both prudery and adultery.2 Even during the years when Trotter was
enmeshed in London’s theatrical scene, however, she was writing work that
garnered her a letter of acknowledgment from John Locke: her defense of
his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690).3 Despite this relatively
high-profile career and her varied output—which embraced prose fiction,
drama, and philosophical writings—Trotter has tended to receive relatively
scant critical attention. As Anne Cline Kelley has pointed out, most commentators have followed her contemporaries in focusing either on her
scandalous ties to the libertine theatrical culture of the Restoration or on
her subsequent image as a pious learned lady (pp. 11-25).
Recent, more nuanced scholarship on Trotter has sought to push beyond
these stereotypes to establish her importance in Restoration culture but
retains something of a divided emphasis. Some commentators, highlighting her importance as a woman writer, have pointed out Trotter’s advocacy
of rational female friendship or her exposure of the violence inherent in
patriarchal power.4 Others argue that Trotter, though a defender of Locke
and Samuel Clarke, also makes a unique philosophical contribution of her
own, offering arguments about the disinterested nature of moral obligation
and the intrinsically authoritative character of natural law.5 These valuable
contributions, however, still leave avenues for further research. Trotter’s
religious beliefs, for example, have rarely been discussed by critics. Raised
in the Church of England, Trotter converted early to Catholicism and
then returned to the Anglican fold sometime around 1707. While many
critical accounts allude to her double conversion, it is usually accounted
for in passing, with the implication that Trotter’s religious commitments
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are of merely biographical interest.6 Kelley, who has argued strenuously for
Trotter’s importance, does not take up her religious commitments in any
detail.
This article will attempt to show, however, that Trotter’s life contains
several hints that her religious beliefs were of more than passing significance both to herself and to contemporaries. Notably, her second conversion resulted in the publication of A Discourse concerning “A Guide in
Controversies,” in Two Letters (1707), which Bishop Gilbert Burnet praised
for “the strength and clearness of the reasoning.”7 I hope to suggest, moreover, that both the structure and themes of Trotter’s early tragedies are
influenced in key ways by religious concerns and questions. Agnes de Castro
(1695), The Fatal Friendship (1698), and The Unhappy Penitent (1701) all
confront the audience with cases of conscience that the protagonists must
attempt both to understand and resolve. Both Protestant and Catholic
traditions made use of such cases as tools for moral discernment. In The
Unhappy Penitent, however, the representation of the authority of conscience is influenced, I will suggest, by Trotter’s exposure to Catholic moral
teaching. Whereas more recent criticism of this play has noted its defense
of female rationality and moral agency, I argue that the play’s tragic conflict
derives from the tension between conscience understood as an individual
moral capacity and conscience understood as an external rule. Questioning
the authority of the former view of conscience, The Unhappy Penitent casts
doubt on the adequacy of private moral judgment and suggests that such
judgment stands in need of authoritative supplement.
Elsewhere in Trotter’s drama, a similar tension reoccurs between individuals and the forms of obligation that bind or constrain their desires.
Repeatedly, her plays subordinate those desires to prior commitments that
overrule subjective interests. Doubt about the authority of “interest” pervades Trotter’s moral philosophy, where she contests any assumption that
“good” and “evil” are subjective rather than transcendent categories. To
the extent that the dramas emphasize the fatal consequences that attend
the breaking of one’s vows, they qualify the extent to which Trotter can be
allied with the kind of secular modernity represented by the contractarian
logic undeniably key to her final play, the heroic drama The Revolution of
Sweden (1706).8 Seeing continuity between Trotter’s plays and her philosophy has the added advantage of avoiding the bifurcation of her career
perpetuated by existing criticism.9
If we consider how religious concerns may inform Trotter’s representation of her characters’ dilemmas, we avoid reproducing an analytic unease
with religious concerns that, as Paula McDowell has noted, can prove distorting when we study an age for which such concerns were ubiquitous.10
Especially among critics of the early modern period, there has been an
increasing agreement that questions of religious conviction and practice
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are not just inescapable but potentially illuminating. Women authors’ religious beliefs in particular have sometimes been dismissively interpreted as a
kind of conservative handicap, but work by Erica Longfellow and Kimberly
Anne Coles, for example, has suggested more productive possibilities.11
Trotter is especially interesting because she writes with erudition on religious and moral issues but also pens popular entertainments. In proposing
a continuity between the questions that occupy Trotter throughout her
career, we can explore how such questions become rendered imaginatively
and thereby gain insight into what Charles Taylor, among others, has
termed the “social imaginary” of an age—the repository of images and narratives in and through which a culture imagines itself.12 Imaginative texts
allow authors to play with such structures in ways that more formal and discursive texts do not; they thus accommodate a flexibility in thinking about
religious issues that is more true to the lived experience of faith. Though
all the evidence suggests that Trotter eventually came to hold a Protestant
view of conscience and a broadly Lockean account of the subject, her tragedies of the 1690s offer a competing vision of the heroism achieved when
individuals accede to authority’s superior claims.
“The fassion of her religion”
Trotter’s religious leanings were remarked upon often enough by those
who knew her to let us speculate that they were known and of some interest to contemporaries. Like Trotter herself, though, those leanings drew
varied reactions. Perhaps not wholly disinterestedly, Burnet praises her
religious reflections: “having been for some time dissatisfied with several
practices and doctrines” of the Catholic Church, he notes in the preface to
A Discourse concerning “A Guide in Controversies,” Trotter “had resolv’d to
examine, with great Care, the Grounds of that Authority, on which they
were received . . . these Papers were the result of those free and impartial
Enquiries” (p. A2r). As might be expected, Trotter’s Catholicism evokes
more ambivalence. In a letter to Locke, Burnet’s third wife, Elizabeth, comments with faint dismay that
the fassion of her religion which allows great libertys, her stract curcumstances, & being forced as it were to write plays, & consequently to contract
Idle acquantance, has left great blemishes on her reputation. . . . she has as I
have ben told spook with great contempt of some who have talked very gently
with her [on] the heads of religion. (qtd. in Kelley, p. 15)

Here, Catholicism is a sort of keeping bad company. In The New Atalantis,
Manley charges Trotter with religious fickleness when, apparently thinking
of A Discourse concerning “A Guide in Controversies,” she jeers at Trotter’s
attempt to make herself “an Ornament to that Religion, which she had
once before abandon’d and newly again profess’d.”13 Whether positive or
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negative, such commentary suggests that religious issues formed part of the
interpretive frame that contemporaries applied to Trotter and perhaps, by
extension, to her works.
Trotter’s Catholicism has not often been seen as a relevant context for
understanding her work, so it is worth noting the biographical details that
establish its significance in her career. These are not numerous, and I am
not claiming to have discovered new facts that enhance that significance;
the point is simply that their coincidence is worth noticing. At this juncture, it may also be useful to note Kelley’s recent revision of Trotter’s likely
birth date. Although most sources, including even Trotter’s gravestone,
point to a birth date in 1679, Kelley has uncovered a baptismal record that
seems to place Trotter’s birth in 1674 (p. 1, n. 1). If this revised date makes
Trotter look slightly less precocious—so that her first play would have
been produced when she was twenty-one rather than sixteen—it may also
give her initial conversion more weight, making it an adult rather than a
juvenile act.
Though the early chronology of her life is blurred, Thomas Birch, editor of her collected works, implies that Trotter had become a Catholic by
1693, the year of her first known work—a poem sent to Bevil Higgons that
congratulates the “lovely youth” on his recovery from smallpox.14 Higgons
had theatrical connections, and a number of commentators cast Trotter’s
gesture as opportunistic networking. However, in the 1690s, Trotter could
scarcely have been ignorant of Higgons’s Catholic and Jacobite ties. The
first publication of Higgons, a member of a prominent Hampshire Catholic
family, had also been a congratulatory poem—to Mary of Modena, on the
birth of James Francis Edward Stuart. In 1692, Higgons actually followed
James II into exile in France, and in 1695-96, he was first associated with
a plot against William and then briefly arrested for conspiracy. His play
The Generous Conqueror (1702) praises James and promotes the politics
of divine right. If Trotter did hope to cultivate Higgons as a professional
acquaintance, it seems hard to believe that she was not also gesturing
sympathetically towards his religio-political affiliations. More ambiguously,
Trotter later sought out Alexander Pope’s patronage and dedicated her
entry in the History of the Works of the Learned (1743) to him. There need
be no sense of religious kinship, of course, for Trotter to seek Pope’s imprimatur though she does single out his “Moral Character” in her dedication.15
Her collected works, in fact, over whose publication it seems that Trotter
exercised some supervision, closes with a translation of a prayer attributed
to St. Francis Xavier that Pope later translates as well—though Pope’s
translation was not published in Trotter’s lifetime—and that, a century or
so later, Gerard Manley Hopkins would translate again. Likely not by the
saint but indebted to Ignatian spirituality, the prayer, whose Latin title is
“O Deus, ego amo te,” is a “rapture” inspired by meditation on a crucifix—a
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curious text for a Protestant author to place in a position of prominence
in her works: “Thou only canst this flame inspire,” Trotter paraphrases, her
diction calling to mind Richard Crashaw’s in “The Flaming Heart” (1648),
“Thou source, and period of desire!”16
Lastly, Trotter’s marriage to the nonjuror Patrick Cockburn, while it
does not connect directly with her Catholicism, makes it plausible that
she was in sympathy with a more critical view of the Restoration settlement than some accounts of her Lockean outlook would lead us to expect.
Trotter married Cockburn in 1708, apparently not long after her return
to the Church of England, and although the family seems for a time to
have lived quite well in Suffolk and then in London, Cockburn’s refusal
to take the oath of allegiance to George I in 1714 caused him to lose his
church living and led to over a decade of hardship for his family until he
reconciled himself to taking the oath in 1726.17 Given the heterogeneity
of the nonjuring community, one cannot assume that a protest against the
accession of George I implies an affirmation of a Catholic claim to the
throne.18 Nonetheless, Trotter’s marriage to Cockburn would seem to place
her at some distance from the Whiggish politics that have sometimes been
ascribed to her (Kelley, p. 134).19
To draw together these biographical details is not to claim that Trotter’s
Catholicism must be granted greater interpretive authority, only to suggest
that it might be. Her one overtly polemical work, A Discourse concerning
“A Guide in Controversies,” does not seem to bear directly on the interpretation of her dramatic texts except to the extent that it explores questions of
interpretive authority. In the tract, Trotter identifies the doctrine of infallibility as her principal point of difference with the Roman Catholic Church.
Writing to an unknown interlocutor, Trotter holds both that there is scant
scriptural basis for ecclesiastical infallibility and that such infallibility is
not itself a necessary premise of scriptural infallibility. As Burnet’s prefatory
comments imply, Trotter’s posture throughout A Discourse concerning “A
Guide in Controversies” is that of an open-minded enquirer, albeit one with
a slight bias towards scriptural evidence; she writes, “I began my search
with a full Perswasion, that my Eternal Salvation depended on my judging
with Sincerity of the Arguments on both Sides, especially of those which
are urg’d from the Holy Scriptures.”20 Consistently, Trotter emphasizes liberty of understanding: “what Absurdity is there in thinking,” she wonders,
“that God has left our Understanding as free as our Will?” (p. 12).
With its emphasis on the authority of individual judgment governed
by the careful reading of scripture, A Discourse concerning “A Guide in
Controversies” implies that Trotter’s reasons for returning to the Church
of England included a desire for greater intellectual autonomy than that
afforded within Catholicism. Despite the clarity of the discourse’s position, however, Trotter’s works do not everywhere grant the authority of
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individual judgment. In The Unhappy Penitent and to a lesser extent in
Trotter’s other plays from the 1690s, tragedy follows or threatens to follow
from the mistaken conclusions of consciences blinded by interest. These
tragedies of conscience thus provide imaginative explorations of how individuals judge incorrectly and what ensues when they do so. The Unhappy
Penitent, moreover, resolves the problem of erring conscience by proposing
that virtue derives from the submission to an authority that enforces its
own judgment.
“What Resolution can be trusted!”: Conscience in The Unhappy Penitent
Performed at Drury Lane in 1701, The Unhappy Penitent is Trotter’s
third tragedy and marks her return to that genre following Love at a Loss
(1700), her sole comedy. Her prior tragedies had merited some applause,
but The Unhappy Penitent does not seem to have been as successful. Critical
reception has remained cool as well; Edmund Gosse remarks that “The
Unhappy Penitent is not a pleasing performance: it is amorous and violent,
but yet dull.”21 Even Kelley finds Ann, the play’s moral center, “one of
Trotter’s least attractive female characters. . . . she lacks humanity—there
is an air of sanctimonious complacency about her” (p. 116). Despite these
lukewarm notices, the play’s representation of female friendship has been
praised. Heather King argues that “by showing women as rational friends
capable of virtue, Trotter . . . revises both reigning constructions of women
as irrational and incapable of friendship and dramatic conventions that
position women as emotional objects rather than rational agents” (p. 7).
According to King, the drama hinges on Ann’s ability to foster the moral
development of her friend and romantic rival, Margarite of Flanders, who
is engaged to Charles VIII of France with whom Ann is in love. Insisting
against her own interest that the prior engagement between Charles and
Margarite be honored, Ann exhorts Margarite to take responsibility for her
actions despite the perfidious counsels of the male characters. Margarite,
however, becomes the unhappy penitent of the title when, having secretly
married her lover the Duke of Lorrain and then vowed to forsake him if
she can be freed from false accusations against her honor, she must do penance for this ill-judged and clandestine marriage by cloistering herself in a
convent. At each stage, Ann steadfastly reminds Margarite of the binding
force of her vows and the honor she must seek to preserve at all costs. King
casts Margarite’s development as a progressive “self-mastery” that depends
on Ann’s “commitment to virtue and community” (pp. 19, 15). Like King,
Paula Backscheider emphasizes how female relationships in Trotter’s plays
foster rational virtue, pointing to the “clearly Lockean” structure of the
female characters’ reflections in Love at a Loss (p. 457). For both critics,
debates over gender form the best context for understanding Trotter’s representations of moral reflection.
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The Unhappy Penitent, like Agnes de Castro and, to a lesser extent, The
Revolution of Sweden, does present an image of female friendship that
emphasizes women’s constancy to one another despite what Rebecca
Merrens has characterized as the “agonistic” homosocial relations of the
men around them (p. 48). In the play’s first moments, the strength of Ann
and Margarite’s bond is emphasized when a character expresses skepticism about a possible match between Ann and Charles by protesting that
“there’s appearance / Of a strict Friendship betwixt” the two women.22
Nonetheless, as the play follows Ann’s attempt to redirect Margarite’s passion back to Charles, the word “strict” has an ongoing resonance. In the
scenes between the two female characters, Ann is less a companionable
supporter of her friend than a stern monitor who arrives onstage to reroute
her straying passions by appealing to the binding force of vows. As a figure
of conscience or a kind of confessor to Margarite, Ann encourages and
enforces a structure of judgment that is less reflective and collaborative
than absolute. The conflict of the drama depends as much on the enforcement of Ann’s judgment as on the conversion of Margarite’s, and at all
points the drama emphasizes the frailty and fallibility of individual determinations of moral duty. The play thus represents the authority of conscience
as largely external to the self and enforced more by rule than reasoned
reflection. This view of conscience bears traces of a seventeenth-century
Catholic moral outlook, which tends to emphasize what Ceri Sullivan calls
“the professional administration” of conscientious self-scrutiny.23
The dramatic structure of The Unhappy Penitent, which emphasizes a
series of dilemmas that characters must resolve, helps to justify the claim
that casuistry, or the process of moral reflection that entails applying general principles to particular cases, is a relevant context for the play. At the
outset, the chief problem is whether Charles is obliged to go through with
his arranged marriage to Margarite or if he is free—as his sister, Madame
de Bourbon, and his courtiers insist—to break off that betrothal and make
a politically advantageous match with the woman whom, conveniently
enough, he also loves. Later, Margarite faces her own series of dilemmas:
should she wait for Charles to abrogate their marriage contract publicly
before marrying Lorrain? Is her vow to enter a convent, made in contradiction to her marriage vows and with incomplete knowledge due to another’s
machinations, a binding one? The plot’s development depends on how
characters answer the central question of what is to be done in a particular
circumstance.24 Marital issues were often the focus of casuistical reasoning. In Ductor Dubitantium: Or, The Rule of Conscience in all her General
Measures (1660), a compilation of cases of conscience, Jeremy Taylor
notes that he omitted most matrimonial questions because these are “very
Material and very Numerous” that they merit a separate volume.25 When
Charles’s advisors urge him to break with Margarite, their logic echoes
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that of such handbooks, with one arguing that the king cannot “break
a Contract which you made not: / ’Twas by your Father in your Infancy”
(p. 3).26 At a few points, the text overtly points to a casuistical context;
in the play’s closing scene, the volatile Lorrain, frustrated by Margarite’s
resolution to enter the convent, fumes that “no Casuists, / No Canons, can
convince like inclination” (p. 45).
Trotter asserts in the play’s dedication to Charles, Lord Halifax, that
her aim is to inculcate an “Instructive Moral,” but the play’s early scenes
seem to bear out her scruple about the moral efficacy of a love plot, which
Trotter claims she “partly design’d in Compliance with the effeminate
taste of the Age” (pp. A2v-3r). While that plot dominates, venality rules
the day. Charles’s scruples about forsaking Margarite seem destined to be
drowned out by his counselors’ calculations about the political capital to be
gained from marriage with Ann; the match between Margarite and Lorrain
is presented as decadently passionate. Lorrain declares early in the second
act, “Look on me as another Antony,” describing himself as Margarite’s
“Slave” (p. 9). Though Margarite’s own preference for Lorrain seems to
make the way clear for the plot’s resolution, matters are complicated not
only by Charles’s doubts but also by the fact that Ann’s father, the Duke of
Brittany, is promoting the match between Charles and his daughter in part
because he loves Margarite himself. No clear moral center emerges until
near the end of the second act, when Ann arrives onstage. This somewhat
belated entrance emphasizes Ann’s distance and difference from the other
characters. Though she has a stake in the potential dismissal of Margarite,
Ann is not seen engaging in the politicking that forms the early central
action. From the time of her arrival onstage, moreover, the play’s locus of
judgment reposes securely in Ann, whose “stoic denial of passion” it ultimately validates.27
Although King rightly argues that the play emphasizes the close bond
between Ann and Margarite, in the women’s first scene together, Ann’s
tone has a note of austerity that undercuts a sense of the two women’s
intimacy and suggests that she wields the authority in their relationship.
Margarite greets her as both “the truest Friend” and “the perfectest / Of all
her Sex,” and though the superlatives emphasize their closeness, they also
introduce a gap between them as Ann’s exceptional nature is highlighted
(p. 13). Left onstage alone together, the women converse in a slightly
stilted fashion. Rather than engage in a process of mutual reflection about
whether Margarite should wed Lorrain privately, they offer differing views
on the question, with Ann contradicting each assessment of the situation that Margarite offers to register her contrasting point of view. When
Margarite suggests how much more she loves Lorrain than she could ever
have loved Charles, Ann stops her: “yet I hope,” she advises,
You’d part with that, rather than stain your Honour,
Not wed Lorrain, rather than not deserve him.
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Mar. Intend you to accuse me?
I am not conscious to my self of guilt.
Ann. We owe our care first to be justify’d
To our own Thoughts, next to the Worlds;
I wou’d not have my Friend give an occasion
For Malice to reproach her, may not the King
T’excuse himself, lay the first Breach on you?
Mar. Therefore we shall conceal our Marriage,
Till he declare his Falshood.
Ann. Innocence needs not such close Coward Arts,
As much the punishment of guilt, as it’s
Security; no Marg’rite, with Actions
Fair, and open, as you know ’em just,
Upbraid the Crime, that shames him to dissembling.
(pp. 13-14)

Ann may be offering Margarite counsel, but their exchange lacks a genuinely dialogic feel, and Ann’s diction—“stain” and “Coward”—has a judgmental and directive edge. Margarite goes on to admit that she is “with
Passion blinded” and thus “may need [Ann’s] aid / To lead” her (p. 14).
This language of support is supplemented by one of obedience; Ann says
she will “advise” Margarite, but Margarite later claims that she will “obey”
her friend’s direction, again suggesting that the power in the relationship
lies with Ann (p. 14). As the scene closes, Ann’s advice to Margarite
emphasizes her own authority: “cherish, and reward my affection,” she tells
Margarite, “that I may ne’er / My choice in this dear Friendship disapprove”
(p. 14). Ann’s invulnerability to her passion for Charles when contrasted
with Margarite’s susceptibility further heightens the gap between the two
women in this scene.
Ann’s authoritative intervention seems necessary as Margarite grapples
with her case of conscience. Her character functions to refocus Margarite’s
attention beyond herself and the play of her feelings, offering a standard
of judgment that transcends the subjective. It is this structural function
of Ann’s role that hearkens to the Catholic view that conscientious judgment must be mediated by an authoritative guide. In itself, casuistry is
common to both Catholic and Protestant traditions in the seventeenth
century. Protestant casuists tend to envision a more strongly inward and
personal process than is found in Catholic texts, which offer a more rulebound structure for conscientious decision-making. The differences are
of emphasis rather than kind, for the extent to which case-based reasoning was widely used by participants in all traditions makes drawing clear
distinctions difficult. Contemporaries, though, knew that conscience
was understood differently across doctrinal lines. Commenting on the
want of “publick provisions of Books of Casuistical Theology” for the
Church of England, Taylor writes in Ductor Dubitantium that “we cannot
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be well supplied out of the Roman Store-houses: for . . . we have found
the Merchants to be deceivers, and the Wares too often falsified” (p. i).
Such texts as Taylor’s were a more prominent aspect of Protestant culture
for, as Camille Slights has noted, Protestant casuistry tended to be more
accessible, circulating in vernacular texts for a general audience, whereas
Catholic casuistry was most often contained in Latin texts intended for
confessors.28 In both contexts, the conscience is always understood primarily as an inward faculty, one that helps the individual apply broad moral
principles to particular problems and that serves as a sort of prosecuting
attorney or judge, examining the heart for signs of error.29
Nonetheless, the questions of how conscience is to be activated and
how it asserts its ultimate authority differ slightly. Susannah Brietz Monta
has cautioned against over-emphasizing the inward nature of conscience
in the Protestant traditions,30 but the structure of conscientious decision
making in manuals by Church of England and Puritan divines alike has a
strongly introspective character and is, importantly, not highly mediated.
Taylor emphasizes the issue of mediation in Ductor Dubitantium when he
charges that
the Casuists of the Roman Church take these things for resolution and answer
to questions of Conscience which are spoken by an authority that is not sufficient; and they admit of Canons, and the Epistles of Popes for authentick
warranties . . . and have not any sufficient means to ascertain themselves what
is binding in very many cases argued in their Canons, and Decretal Epistles,
and Bulls of Popes. (p. iii)

By contrast, Protestant casuists assume that the individual will initiate the
process of self-scrutiny himself and pursue it with an adequate degree of
rigor. “Protestantism,” Slights writes, “assumes that ultimately everyone
is his own casuist and must think through every moral doubt for himself”
(p. 35).31 Conscience is personal if not individualistic, “inviolable,” though
“by no means autonomous” (p. 26). In these manuals, the aim is to help
the individual discover what William Perkins calls the “little God setting
in the middle of mens hearts.”32
Catholic examination of conscience, by contrast, takes a more mediated
approach and is typically oriented towards preparing the individual for the
sacrament of penance or confession. Built into the Catholic conception
of conscience, therefore, is the need for recourse to an authority that is, if
not precisely external to the self—because the good conscience will be in
harmony with that authority—at least structured in a way that implicitly
questions whether the individual will adequately carry out the process of
self-scrutiny on his or her own. Manuals to prepare the individual for confession reveal this more mediated approach when they offer readers lists of
questions, ranked under each of the ten commandments, to identify a wide
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range of possible infractions. Breaking down the principle “Thou shalt not
kill,” for example, the Jesuit William Warford asks the reader to consider “if
he have refused to pardon or remit injuries, to those which have offended
him,” or “if he have cursed others, either alive or dead: and with what
intention.”33 The phrasing of these hypothetical sins seems to invite repetition in the confessional so that the penitent can ventriloquize the language
of an authority that has already established the range of possible offenses.
Such ventriloquism is also of course implied by the inclusion of acts of
contrition and other prayers that give shape and substance to conscientious
reflection. Embedded in such practices is a belief that the individual conscience is neither so unique nor so perspicacious as to require a unique form
for its articulation. Rather, external form governs self-presentation; conscience’s conclusions are common, not idiosyncratic. The Confiteor that
Warford includes runs, “I have grievously offended in thought, word, and
deed, through my fault, my fault, my most grievous fault,” and he observes
that “Catholike people use to knock their brest” during its recitation
(pp. 59-60). Here, the scripting of spiritual transformation, even down to
its physical performance, guarantees rather than undermines authenticity.34
In The Unhappy Penitent, part of Ann’s dramatic function is to provide
an authoritative characterization of Margarite’s situation and, to a lesser
extent, Charles’s. As she serves to correct erring consciences, she assumes
the kind of mediating authority that is embedded in Catholic penitential manuals. From this angle, her generally austere manner may be seen
to position her as Margarite’s confessor rather than confidante. When
Margarite accuses Ann of making her “miserable” by encouraging Charles
to honor the initial marriage contract, Ann retains control of the language
of value; she has acted, she says, in hopes “that both might so acquit your
selves with honour” (p. 19). Margarite’s situation is
sad yet better to be born,
Than the reproaches of all the Just and Vertuous
Of Mankind, or what’s more terrible,
The Stings of sharp remors for violated Vows. (p. 20)

Though Margarite accepts Ann’s assessment—“You did the duty of a
Friend, I know you did”—that assessment remains to some extent exterior
to her own judgment (p. 20). She asks Ann to “leave me for a while to my
destraction, / I wou’d alone indulge it to the height” (p. 20). More significantly, her acquiescence is only temporary, for she succumbs to Lorrain’s
pleas to marry him clandestinely. “Passion,” Lorrain tells her presciently, “is
all your Principle of Conscience” (p. 23). Rather than staging Margarite’s
progressive assimilation of Ann’s judgments, the play implies that the binding of conscience depends on the presence of a superintending authority
whose judgment may be admitted but not always obeyed.
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As the play progresses, Ann tends to appear on stage to reprove Margarite
for straying from her virtuous resolutions, and she admonishes more often
than she directly assists her friend. Hearing of Margarite’s improvident marriage with Lorrain, Ann laments, “there’s no certain worth, / On which to
found a firm, exalted Friendship; / I saw in you, a stock that promis’d much”
and moralizes that her friend has been “indulgent to [her] vicious Passions”
(pp. 35-36). Ann thus typically offers judgment rather than counsel. In
the play’s closing scene, Margarite’s exoneration from Brittany’s calumnies
requires her renunciation of Lorrain. As she accepts this renunciation,
King argues, we can see the “complete . . . self-mastery” that Margarite has
achieved with Ann’s counsel (p. 19). However, in the resolution of this
final case of conscience, there are several signs that Ann retains her function as an externalized figure of conscientious authority. Ann’s first words
to Margarite after her honor is restored are neither congratulatory nor
consolatory but stern: “Now my poor Friend, does not your melting heart /
Repent your Vow?” she asks (p. 44). Whether she is chiding Margarite for
her rash promise or probing her fidelity to that promise, Ann is the external authority that activates Margarite’s conscience. When Margarite again
wavers, Ann again bewails her frailty, exclaiming, “She’s lost! What resolution can be trusted!” (p. 46). She is less a faithful friend than a remorseless
enforcer of Margarite’s obligations to heaven.
In her dialogue with Lorrain in the play’s closing scene, Margarite seems
to have adopted Ann’s judgment to the extent that she emphasizes abstract
virtue over the claims of feeling, but her actions suggest that she remains
unsure if she can honor her vow to enter the cloister. Her marriage vow
to Lorrain, she observes, “was it self null’d by my former Contract,” making her promise to separate from him binding (p. 45). Though she and
Lorrain “strove with fate, broke to each other / Through all Obligations,
Conscience, and Honour,” Margarite declares that they must now submit to “the Will of Heav’n” (p. 45). In practice, though, she falters: “O
Madam,” she says, appealing to Ann, “now assist, take, force me from
him, / Or I shall yield, forget my Vow, fly perjur’d / To his Arms” (pp.
45-46). Her self-mastery seems to have limits. While Ann is largely silent
as Margarite explains to Lorrain why they must part, she is on hand and
steps in to escort Margarite offstage at the critical moment. Margarite has
to be virtually carried away. She exclaims, “I tear my self for ever, ever, from
thee!” (p. 47), in a moment that Robert Hume describes as “sentimental
mush of the most contrived sort.”35 The stage direction notes that she exits
“led by Women,” and her brother notes, “She faints, support, lead her
away” (p. 47). The scene’s sentimental excess is slightly mitigated if we see
the crucial tension here as whether Ann’s determination will prevail over
Margarite’s yielding temperament; the play certainly asks us to sympathize
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with Margarite but that sympathy is tempered by the supervening judgment
that Ann represents.
While Ann’s function in the play seems to be to impress on Margarite
the claims of conscience, she is not an infallible paragon. Like the other
characters, she is duped by her father’s plot to besmirch Margarite’s reputation. Yet, although Brittany’s cunning can lead Ann astray, she never offers
false counsel. The plot twist in fact serves to accentuate her virtue, for
when she hears the allegation that Charles and Margarite have consummated their relationship, she believes in Margarite’s innocence, prioritizing
friendship over love, and is willing to go against her own interests to accuse
Charles when he seems to malign Margarite. When her father’s plot begins
to unravel and her own error appears, Ann declares, “Let truth be known,
who ever it condemn” (p. 43). Ann is vulnerable to deception, but her
values and decision-making process remain sound.
Trotter also has Charles acknowledge his duty to Margarite largely
independent of Ann’s counsel. In fact, critical accounts that stress Trotter’s
negative portrayal of patriarchal structures, while largely accurate, should
accommodate the fact that Charles is akin to Ann in his determination to
honor even those vows contrary to his inclination. Though Ann does not
exert the same direct authority over Charles that she does over Margarite,
she still supplies a pattern for his own conscientious reflections. In their
first scene together, Charles occasionally wavers in his resolution to marry
Margarite, but Ann reinforces it, reassuring him that
A noble heart dreads nothing more than finding
The choice it made unworthy, and sees with pleasure
It’s inclination justify’d by merit,
Tho’ to the loss of what was dearest to it. (p. 16)

Later, she tells Charles
cou’d you be tempted from your Faith
To Heav’n and Marg’rite, not all the shining Glories
Of your Crown . . . shou’d bribe me from my just Disdain,
Of a dishonourable and impious
Alliance, and undeserving my Esteem. (p. 17)

Once again, Ann’s judgments of the situation are given a normative force.
Charles emphasizes her role in supporting his determination when he
acclaims her “a glorious Model” and assures her that “To preserve your
heart I will for ever lose you” (p. 17). Ann’s “Esteem” and approbation thus
remain a standard even when her direct assistance is not required. Though
Charles hesitates over the right course of action, Ann never does. If one
might accuse Trotter of creating in Ann a drearily virtuous champion of
self-denial—Trotter declaims in the play’s closing lines, “let us correct our
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selves / By these Examples” of “Unruly passion”—her character is more
plausible when understood as an element of the larger casuistical structure of the drama (pp. 47-48). That structure suggests that conscientious
reflection is defined neither solely by introspection nor collaboration but
by a negotiation of authority whose mediated structure secures rather than
hinders the proper ordering of the oft-recalcitrant will.
The Tragic Potential of “The Interested Scheme”
The Unhappy Penitent’s use of moral dilemma as a plot device is representative of Trotter’s other early tragedies, but these plays also share a
consistent thematic focus that is of interest. With some variation, each,
like The Unhappy Penitent, centers on a situation in which characters must
determine the extent to which they are obliged to honor prior vows and
promises. In Agnes de Castro, the Prince struggles to remain faithful to his
wife, Constantia, despite his passion for Agnes, who struggles to decide
after Constantia’s death if she may return his love. In The Fatal Friendship,
Gramont must decide whether or not to enter into a bigamous marriage
with Lamira that will protect his first wife, Felicia, from her brother’s
wrath, enable his friend Castalio to be freed from jail, and provide him sufficient funds to ransom his and Felicia’s kidnapped son. As in The Unhappy
Penitent, these plays raise questions about the binding nature of vows made
before the dramatic action opens and sometimes against the characters’
own interests—as in Agnes de Castro, where Constantia herself admits that
“Th’ insensible my Husband, never felt / A transport of Fierce Love” and
that he apparently married her for reasons of state.36 Though The Unhappy
Penitent heightens these tensions by presenting a situation in which the
vows to be honored were made both on behalf of the protagonists and
counter to their wishes, these thematic elements are present from Trotter’s
first drama.
That Trotter’s tragedies emphasize the need to be true to one’s vows must
be considered before endorsing the view that Trotter can be unproblematically associated with a Lockean contractarian politics that is in turn linked
with, as Susan Staves puts it, a “secular and utilitarian” view of obligation
more broadly.37 Trotter’s ties to Locke are indisputable. In the realm of
philosophy, she defends the moral epistemology of An Essay concerning
Human Understanding against the suggestion that it inadequately accounts
for the origins and reality of moral distinctions. In the realm of politics, as
Kelley notes, Trotter frequently points out the harms inflicted by tyrants
(pp. 134-38). Tyranny certainly seems to receive a contractarian rebuke in
The Revolution of Sweden, whose heroine, again named Constantia, bests a
political opponent when she argues on behalf of the popular right to rebellion. According to Constantia, the people must have recourse
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When Kings who are in Trust
The Guardians of the Laws, the publick Peace and Welfare,
Confess no Law but Arbitrary Will,
Or know no use of Pow’r but to Oppress,
And Injure, with Impunity.38

Though her antagonist argues that political authority derives from power,
Constantia argues that such power ultimately comes from the people:
Is it Rebellion for a wretched People
Oppress’d and Ruin’d, by that Power they gave
For their Defence, the safety of their Rights
To seek Redress? (p. 19)

Such moments suggest Trotter’s sympathy with political ideals articulated by Locke and others though it is worth noting that her own work
is more consistently informed by the philosophy of An Essay concerning
Human Understanding than the politics of his Two Treatises of Government
(1689).
Nonetheless, it is necessary to be cautious about identifying Trotter
with Lockean thought more broadly or with the kind of secular modernity
for which Locke often stands as a convenient figure.39 To the extent that
tragedy in Trotter’s dramas ensues when individuals break or are unfaithful
to their vows, the dramas express ambivalence about the role of interest or desire in moral judgment. Setting aside the political implications
of this ambivalence, Trotter’s skepticism about the authority of desire
accords with her impatience with voluntarist doctrines of moral obligation. Voluntarism—what Trotter terms “the interested scheme”—plays on
desire by orienting morality around the will, not reason, and grounding
obligation in pleasure and pain rather than right and wrong.40 Trotter consistently objects to this identification of the right with the advantageous.
In so doing, she marks her break with Locke, whose voluntarism she tried
unsuccessfully to deny.41 Unlike Locke, Trotter consistently seeks to derive
moral obligation from normative sources beyond the self. In so doing, she
draws on an arguably richer metaphysical view that again highlights the
potential importance of her religious views for understanding her work
more broadly. As in The Unhappy Penitent, vows in Trotter’s other early
tragedies provide the standard for conscientious judgment. And as in The
Unhappy Penitent, trouble arises when individuals seek to renege on their
formal commitments. In Agnes de Castro, a play that adapts the 1688 prose
fiction of the same title by Aphra Behn that in turn borrows from a work
by Jean-Baptiste de Brilhac, the Prince’s passion for the eponymous heroine precipitates the tragedy and appalls even the Prince himself. When
his love is discovered, the Prince describes his passion as a “Crime” and,
tormented at the prospect of violating his marriage vows, accuses himself
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of “wronging” his wife (p. 8). Although the murder of Constantia by the
villainess Elvira conveniently opens the way for the Prince and Agnes
to marry, the plot highlights desire’s transgressive and disruptive potential, which is confirmed by Agnes’s death (Merrens, p. 46). In The Fatal
Friendship, the tragedy frames as specious the protagonist’s suggestion that
abandoning his marriage vows is a heroic act. Speculating about what will
happen to his wife, comrade, and child if he does not commit bigamy,
Gramont wonders,
should I sacrifice ’em all, to keep
A little peace of mind. . . .
Walk on by rules, and calmly let ’em perish,
Rather than tread one step beyond to save ’em?42

Rather than valorize Gramont, the play confronts him with Felicia’s insistent fidelity: “Look on me,” she implores him after learning of his bigamy,
“look upon your wretched Wife!” (2:518). The value she places on her marriage vow leads Felicia, when confronted with her romantic rival, to rely
on that vow rather than be drawn into a romantic contest: “I’ll not dispute
with you my Charms,” she declares, “But urge my Right in him” (2:514).
Staves suggests that late Restoration plays increasingly present oaths as
open to negotiation and revision, imagining how “a nominalist universe
of force and passion triumphs over an idealist universe of words” (p. 192).
More recently, Toni Bowers has noted that promise keeping (and breaking) retain their purchase in works that keep a skeptical distance from
the liberal Restoration settlement.43 In The Fatal Friendship, it is only
Lamira, the villainess, who slights the power of vows and celebrates passion: “Because he swore to you, think you that Men / Remember Oaths in
their loose Pleasures made?” she scoffs to Felicia (2:514). Later, she suggests that Gramont’s “adulterated love” releases his first wife from her own
vows (2:516). In Agnes de Castro, the wicked Elvira scoffs at the idea of
conscience, calling its influence “the childish prejudice of Education” and
describing it as “a turn-coat Monitor” (p. 34). Her comments are immediately succeeded by the appearance of a ghost onstage, a rather clumsy
device whose sole function is to enforce the judgment of conscience that
Elvira has sought to dismiss. As in The Unhappy Penitent, a faulty conscience that misjudges the binding power of oaths must be corrected by an
external “Monitor.” All three plays thematize the chaos that ensues when
individuals make fresh calculations of their best interests instead of remaining subject to their existing promises. Particularly because they emphasize
the binding power of commitments made prior to the dramatic action,
Trotter’s plays insist that passion must be brought under the government of
ideals even when their motive power diminishes.
To a certain extent, the emphasis on promise keeping in Trotter’s plays
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is indebted to the emphasis on honor prominent in the heroic tradition
though the motif of honor is somewhat more prevalent in the drama of
the earlier rather than the later Restoration when pathos increasingly
prevails.44 Arguably, though, Trotter’s plays invoke broader contexts than
genre alone. As many critics note, she is self-consciously a moralist.
Though the religious and political implications of the theme of fidelity
to one’s vows are suggestive, given a lack of biographical evidence, determinations must be tentative at best. In terms of the religious context,
Staves has noted that despite the revocation of the Civil Marriage Act,
the Restoration sees a continued development of the idea of marriage as a
contractual relationship (p. 116). King adds that Love at a Loss “examines
the implications of contract theory in courtship” and represents vows as
theoretically negotiable.45 However, Trotter’s tragedies seem to resist a contractual view of marriage. Even Love at a Loss concludes with Lesbia married to the man to whom she was originally engaged rather than the man
she prefers; as King observes, “Her choice . . . was ultimately for what she
should do, not what she wants to do” (p. 142). If it is hard to attribute to
Trotter a definitively sacramental view of marriage, her tragedies at least sit
at odds with the spirit of the age by insisting on vows’ durability. In terms
of the political context, an analogy between the domestic relationships of
the tragedies and political relationships is warranted by Staves’s claim that
representations of familial authority shift with changing representations of
political authority in the period (pp. 111-18).46 The political context for
Trotter’s emphasis on fidelity and on the power of prior oaths would seem
to be Jacobitism.47 Gosse even proposes that Trotter has “Jacobite propensities.”48 As I suggested above, however, claiming Trotter for the Jacobite
cause is inadvisable if tempting. The difficulty of defining what it means
to be a Jacobite in the 1690s is too great and the biographical evidence
too slim to make a conclusive judgment possible. Bowers’s suggestion that
a “new-tory sensibility” arises in the early eighteenth century to stake out
a space of political resistance less extreme than Jacobitism offers one way
of understanding how someone like Trotter could hold to a political stance
more nuanced than traditional binary oppositions allow (pp. 45-51).
Rather than focus specifically on the particular religious or political
stakes of the plays’ representation of vows or contracts, however, I would
argue that seeing this theme as an instance of Trotter’s focus on the broader
category of “interest” makes her moral philosophy the most relevant context for understanding its stakes. If we see the early plays as imaginatively
preoccupied with the ill effects of desire, a continuity emerges with her
later discursive works’ denial that interest is a central category in morals.
As Sheridan and Martha Brandt Bolton have both noted, Trotter works
hard both to deny the voluntarist account of moral obligation and to exonerate Locke from voluntarism because she is disquieted by the idea that in
69

pursuing the rewards and avoiding the punishments of an omnipotent God,
the individual in a voluntarist scheme seeks her own pleasure in determining her moral obligations.49 She asserts in Remarks upon some Writers in the
Controversy concerning the Foundations of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation
(1743), “I readily grant . . . that the relation of things to our own happiness,
as sensible beings, is a very material relation, worth examining into; but it
does not follow, that there is no other worth considering.”50 Trotter prefers
a tripartite scheme of moral motivation that embraces not only “happiness”
and “misery” but also a good that derives its force from the individual’s
rational and social, rather than simply sensual, natures. The underlying
assumption is that moral good and evil inhere in the nature of things and in
certain actions: “Though pleasure may be generally consequent upon doing
a right or morally good action, that is not the true reason of doing it, is not
the end the agent has in view,” she contends, “The rectitude or goodness of
the action makes it preferable in itself” (1:424). Locke’s moral psychology
sounds more hedonistic: “Things then are Good or Evil,” he writes, “only in
reference to Pleasure or Pain.”51 This statement squares with his belief that
“Morally Good and Evil . . . is only the conformity or Disagreement of our
voluntary Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from
the Will and Power of the Law-maker” (p. 351). Essentially, the principles
of moral conduct are here shaped by calculations about what will produce
the greatest quantum of happiness.
Critics have debated the extent of Locke’s voluntarism, but it seems
clear that Trotter places less emphasis on interest—or that which pleases
our “sensible” nature—than Locke, largely as a result of a different underlying metaphysical and religious picture.52 Trotter’s greater emphasis on
a teleological account of human nature and her belief in “eternal moral
truths” that transcend God’s commands mean that, for her, doing what
is right is intrinsically appealing and only coincidentally desirable.53 In a
letter to her niece that denies Locke’s sympathy with voluntarism, Trotter
does admit that “I am not myself satisfied upon a review of what Mr. Locke
has said on moral relations” and worries that “he has given occasion to
the interested scheme so much in fashion of late.”54 Though her plays are
not mere fictionalizations of her philosophy, the tragic conflict they stage
between principle and subjective judgment resonates with Trotter’s desire,
as a philosopher, to offer disinterested grounds for morality. The standard
of value for Trotter lies always beyond the self, whose limited ability to
discern the good is her consistent theme; the “pleasure” and “pain” of the
individual are hardly a reliable standard for her.55 Moral heroism, moreover,
depends on self-abnegation, on governing the will despite the powerful
movements of desire. Ann anchors the moral framework of The Unhappy
Penitent because she perceives, and directs others to perceive, the claims of
conscience over and against the will. This perception can certainly be read
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as the triumph of a certain sort of rationality,56 but it is also a spiritual triumph, one whose underlying metaphysical grounds should not be ignored.
For Trotter, the will is always in service to that numinous reality, the good:
the will, she writes, will naturally be subject to “the necessary relations and
essential differences of things.”57 If we are tempted to let interpretive weight
fall on how Trotter imagines and makes available the individual’s ability to
affirm what is “necessary,” the “essential” nature of the good is the constant
backdrop against which individual choice is exercised.
Critics are increasingly realizing, or remembering, that religion forms
an often unavoidable context for understanding literature of the long
eighteenth century. In this context, Trotter’s case can help us notice that
individual religious crisis—internal debate about the “Fassion of [one’s]
Religion”—does not necessarily entail a shift towards secularity. The overarching argument here has been that Trotter’s two conversions highlight
the extent to which matters of faith play an important role in her life and
thought. Her biography, moreover, hints at more complex socio-religious
affiliations than have previously been noted. Casting her as a largely secular author, as many critics have tended to do, feels especially inappropriate
when one considers the consistently religious focus of the writings that
absorbed her energy later in life. Recovering a Catholic context in which
to understand the structure and thematic concerns of her early tragedies
can help us perceive a continuity, in emphasis if not in doctrine, across her
career. In those early tragedies, it may be tempting to see the consciencestricken individual as a figure for Trotter herself—torn, we might speculate,
between older, hierarchical institutions and a modernizing individualism.
However, to the extent that the tragedies affirm individuals’ choices to
sacrifice their desires and submit to authoritative judgment, they affirm the
moral achievement of what we might think of as an alternatively modern
individual, one whose liberty is more readily recognizable when understood
as the product of a specifically religious experience.
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